Exposing Private Information from Side-Channel Leaks in your Browser by Tom Van Goethem
Building a Threat Hunting Program by Carl Manion
It is a well-known fact that the web is constantly evolving, both on a technical level as well as the way we interact with it. As the web was originally designed to be a static information retrieval platform, this evolution has brought along a large variety of security issues. Next to the usual suspects such as SQL injection and XSS, a new class of web-based vulnerabilities is surfacing. Similar to how attackers exploit cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities, this "up-and-coming" class of vulnerabilities leverages the fact that browsers include cookies on requests to third-party websites. By exploiting side-channel leaks in browsers, adversaries can determine the size of the associated responses. In this webcast, we will explore three such attacks (browser-based timing attack, HEIST, storage side-channel attack), and show how these can be used to extract sensitive content from popular web services. In addition, we demonstrate that in combination with other attacks, these side-channel leaks can be used to extract secret tokens from web pages, possibly leading to a full account compromise.