We all know the story, the issues, the lay of the land. Depending on how it's defined and who's defining, Windows security is both impossible and essential. So how we describe the problem IS the problem.

Thieme shows how focusing on the security context instead of granular content illuminates the content that's critical and the path to it that's optimal. As well as how to think about the problem.

Richard Thieme (www.thiemeworks.com) is a Contributing Editor for Information Security Magazine and, according to The Linux Journal, a "hacker philosopher journalist sage" whose presentations at security and hacking conventions are always well-attended and well-received. He speaks eloquently about the relationships between technology, people, and spirituality and always speaks straight to the heart of important matters right at the front of the audience's collective mind. He is very subtle ... and extremely deep."

Thieme consults, writes, and speaks about "life on the edge," in particular the human dimensions of technology and the work place. His focus these days is on security and identity - how to play chess while the board is disappearing.

Thieme has published widely. Translated into German, Chinese, Japanese, Slovene, Danish and Indonesian, his articles are taught at universities in Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States. His column, "Islands in the Clickstream," has been published in Singapore, Toronto, and Capetown and is distributed to subscribers in 60 countries. Archives are at http://www.thiemeworks.com.

In the last year many vulnerabilities have been found on ActiveX controls massively deployed, right now millons of computers are still running vulnerable ActiveX controls, most of Activex vulnerabilities can be easily exploited to compromise systems. This talk discusses how to perform a black box security audit on ActiveX controls. The process of auditing an ActiveX is not a very complex task and the audience will learn how to manually do it in a few minutes with great success with the help of free available tools.

Cesar Cerrudo is a independent security researcher/consultant specialized on application security. In the latest years he has found many vulnerabilities on top software such as MS SQL Server, MS Biztalk Server, MS Commerce Server, MS Windows 2000, Oracle database server, Yahoo! Messenger, etc. He has presented about SQL Server security at Black Hat and Microsoft in the last year.

Jennifer Stisa Granick joined Stanford Law School in January 2001, as Lecturer in Law and Executive Director of the Center for Internet and Society (CIS). She teaches, speaks and writes on the full spectrum of Internet law issues including computer crime, national security and constitutional rights, and electronic surveillance, areas in which her expertise is recognized nationally.

Granick came to Stanford after almost a decade practicing criminal defense law in California. Her experience includes stints at the Office of the State Public Defender and at a number of criminal defense boutiques, before founding the Law Offices of Jennifer S. Granick, where she focused on hacker defense and other computer law representations at the trial and appellate level in state and federal court. At Stanford, she currently teaches the Cyberlaw Clinic, one of the nation's few law and technology litigation clinics.

Granick continues to consult on computer crime cases and serves on the Board of Directors of the Honeynet Project, which collects data on computer intrusions for the purposes of developing defensive tools and practices. She earned her law degree from University of California, Hastings College of the Law and her undergraduate degree from the New College of the University of South Florida.

Curt Karnow moves through a fast-paced assessment of legal problems stemming from security breaches, followed by a review of polices which can help mitigate that liability. Following a quick look at types of breaches and trends, the presentation maps out the wide variety of liabilities that follow these breaches—such as trade secret disclosure, privacy, HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, breach of contract, California's new laws such as SB 1368—and many others. It then focuses on indirect liability for security breaches—when site manages and owners are found liable for third party attacks, such as with distributed denial of service. The balance of the talk spotlights the key role policies have in working with law enforcement and reducing legal exposure. Curt Karnow concludes with a look at inadequate, conflicting, and badly-followed policies- and why those lead directly to new rounds of legal problems.

Curtis E.A. Karnow specializes in intellectual property litigation and technology law including computer, Internet, and multimedia issues. He is the author of Future Codes: Essays in Advanced Computer Technology and The Law (Artech House: London/Boston, 1997) and currently represents Sun in the landmark technology antitrust case, Sun Microsystems v Microsoft.

Mr. Karnow has handled numerous software licensing, electronic commerce, website and other computer-related transactions involving parties including wine.com, Capcom Entertainment, Excite@Home, ASCII Corporation, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Cisco, Sony Computer Entertainment of America, and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). He has advised a global home entertainment corporation on trademark and gray market import matters; counseled a computer peripheral manufacturer on the evaluation, licensing, and enforcement of patents; advised a web navigation company on Internet legal issues, and prepared a variety of Internet-related commercial agreements. He has defended a national engineering firm against allegations of software copyright violations; defended a variety of clients against allegations by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Software Publishers’ Association (SPA) of software copyright infringement; counseled an international game company on Internet copyright and trademark issues; represented a software encryption company on licensing issues; and represented a developer of encryption products on export control and related grand jury and intellectual property issues.

From 1978-1980, Mr. Karnow was an Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. There, his responsibilities included prosecution of all federal crimes, including complex white collar fraud, from investigation and indictment through jury verdict and appeal. Since then, he has represented defendants indicted for unauthorized access to federal interest computers; defended against a criminal grand jury investigation into high tech export actions; represented clients before federal grand juries investigating alleged antitrust conspiracies; and in a state criminal investigation represented a computer professional framed by a colleague in a complex computer sabotage. He has also counseled on jurisdictional issues arising out of a federal criminal Internet-related indictment, and advises on legal issues (including working with law enforcement and in particular the FBI) arising from third party computer security breaches.

Viagra! Work from home! Who sends this stuff? And what if not all Spam is what it appears to be? This talk discusses forensic methods for identifying forged emails and tracking individual senders who would otherwise be anonymous.

This presentation demonstrates how to apply data forensics to spam in order to identify the sender of specific spam messages. Some senders can be identified by name, while others can be distinguished by attributes such as preferences, nationality, religion, and even left-handedness. Four spam categories are provided that classify spam by function, including List Makers, Scams, and Covert Communication channels. The examples provided include full-disclosure case studies: a phishing gang that targets bank customers with malware and impersonations, and an IRC group that uses spam as a covert communication channel.

Curtis Kret (pseudonym) has a Ph.D. in Computer Science and over 15 years of computer security experience. His current research focuses on methods to track “anonymous” people and applying the research to Spam. Dr. Kret is currently working with Secure Science Corporation, a professional services and software company that develops advanced technology dedicated to protecting online assets. Secure Science Corp. is pioneering innovative ways to transform the Internet into a secure environment for both online communications and transactions.

Windows XP: Improving Resiliency
Steve Riley, Microsoft Senior Consultant, MCS Trustworthy Computing Services

In Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2, Microsoft is introducing a set of security technologies that will help to improve the ability of Windows XP-based computers to withstand malicious attacks from viruses and worms. The technologies include network protection, memory protection, safer e-mail handling, more secure browsing, and improved computer maintenance. Together, these security technologies will help to make it more difficult to attack Windows XP, even if the latest updates are not applied. These security technologies together are particularly useful in mitigation against worms and viruses. Included in this presentation are examples and details of the technology changes in Service Pack 2 and implications for developers.

Steve Riley is a product manager in Microsoft's Security Business Unit in Redmond, Washington, USA. Steve specializes in network and host security, communication protocols, network design, and information security policies and process. His customers include various ISPs and ASPs around the United States, as well as traditional enterprise IT customers, for whom he has conducted security assessments and risk analyses, deployed technologies for prevention and detection, and designed highly-available network architectures. A router-rooter almost from birth, Steve grew up in networking and telecommunications; the simple telephone still provides endless hours of exploratory joy. Steve is a frequent and popular speaker at Microsoft conferences. Besides lurking in the Internet's dark alleys and secret passages, he enjoys mountain biking, clubbing and the occasional rave, freely sharing his opinions about the intersection of technology and culture, and hanging with his family and friends in the center of the universe otherwise known as Seattle, Washington.

Many Windows 2000/XP/2003 functions depend on RPC service. By enumerating Windows RPC endpoint-map elements, you will differentiate between the followings: Windows NT 4.0 SP3 or before and Windows NT 4.0 SP4 or later, Windows 2000 SP2 or before and Windows 2000 SP3 or later, default Windows XP and Windows XP SP1, Windows XP Home Edition and Windows XP Professional. This presentation will show what differences are there between Windows 2000/XP/2003.

Hidenobu Seki, aka Urity works as a network security specialist at SecurityFriday Co., Ltd in Japan. He has published many tools, ScoopLM/BeatLM/GetAcct/RpcScan etc. He has been a speaker at the Black Hat Windows Security 2002 and 2003.